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WSRA Mandatory Comprehensive Management Plans
THE WILD AND SCENIC RIVER ACT'S
MANDATORY COMPREHENSIVE MANAGE-
MENT PLANS: ARE THEY REALLY MAN-
DA TORY?
Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv.'
by Douglas L. McHoney
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Circuit's recent
decision in Newton County Wildlife
Ass 'n2 profoundly impacts whether
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
(WSRA) comprehensive manage-
ment plans are required for land
management activities that occur
outside of, but affect, river
segments designated by Congress.
The Eighth Circuit's difficulty
interpreting the statutory require-
ments of the WSRA and determin-
ing Congressional intent could lead
to abuse by agencies that control
areas in and around such designated
segments.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1992, Congress desig-
nated six river segments within the
Ozark National Forest as possessing
outstanding remarkable environ-
mental values in the national wild and
scenic river system.3 Section 1274
of the WSRA required the U.S.
Forest Service, as the responsible
federal agency, to prepare a
comprehensive management plan
within three fiscal years of this
designation.' The statute required
the plan to address resource
protection, the development of lands
on the designated areas, and other
management policies.' The Forest
Service was unable to meet the
three-year deadline for this compre-
hensive management plan, which
expired September 30, 1995.6
In early 1994, after amend-
ing its own forest management plan7
to take into account the new
designations, the U.S. Forest
Service prepared an environmental
assessment discussing the possible
effects of four timber sales within
the Ozark National Forest.' Be-
tween August 23, 1994, and
September 12, 1995, the U.S. Forest
Service issued final agency actions
approving these four timber sales.9
The Newton County Wildlife
Association, the Sierra Club, and
other individuals ("Wildlife Associa-
tion") brought suit against the U.S.
Forest Service and four of its
employees ("Forest Service") to
enjoin the sales of timber. 0 The
Wildlife Association contended that
the sales violated the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act."
The Wildlife Association
claimed that the failure to meet the
plans' deadline prohibited the
Forest Service from selling the
timber until the plans were com-
pleted. 12  The Forest Service
contended that the timber sales
were not within the river segments
designated by Congress." Further,
the Forest Service contended that




Id The Forest Service maintains land and resource protection plans for each national forest. Id at 113. See 16 U.S.C.
§1274(dX IX 1994).
Newton County Wildlife Ass'n, 113 F.3d at 112.
The Forest Service's plans -provide for multiple use and sustained yield of products and services.. coordination of outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness." 16 U. S.C. § l604(e)(1); see 36 C.F.R. Part 219.
Newton Counly Wildlife Ass'n, 113 F.3d at 113. Neither the original management plan nor the environmental assessment
met the requirements of 16 U.S.C. §1274(d)(1). Id. The original management plans were made pursuant to 16 U.S.C.
§1604(e)(1). Id. See36C.F.R. Part 219.
Newton County Wildlife Ass'n, 1 13 F.3d at 112
" Id.
Id. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 271 and 1274 (1994). The Wildlife Association also contended that the sales violated the Migratory
Bird and Treaty Act (MBTA). Newton County Wildlife Ass'n, 113 F.3d at 114. The Wildlife Association claimed that the
Forest Service's failure to obtain a special purpose permit from the United States Fish and Wildlife service violated the
MBTA. Id. The Wildlife Association claimed that the timber sales would harm the nesting migratory bird population in the
areas where the timber harvest took place. Id. See infra notes 27-30 and 44-46 and accompanying text.
NewtonCouny WildlifeAss'n, 113 F.3d at 112.
Id at 113.
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the WSRA plan need only encom-
pass lands within the designated
segment.14  Consequently, the
Forest Service argued that the plans
could not affect the timber sales.' 5
The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas denied the Wildlife
Association's motion to preliminar-
ily enjoin the timber sales.' 6 The
District Court ruled that completion
of the WSRA plans was not a
prerequisite for such timber sales.'7
However, the Court did find that the
plans must encompass areas that
may affect a designated river
segment, despite lying outside its
borders. 8 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed only the first
part of the District Court's decision,
holding that the WSRA does not
require the plans' completion before
timber -sales may be approved.' 9
The Eighth Circuit reversed on the
scope of the plans, holding that the
plans were not required because the
sales lay outside of the designated
areas. 20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Wild and Scenic River Act
The development of federal
water policy began in 1902 when
Congress passed the Reclamation
Act. 2 The Act was an attempt to
reclaim the American West from the
desert through irrigation.22 In 1920
Congress passed the Federal Power
Act, calling for the development of
the country's rivers and creating the
Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission.23 However, since the mid-
1960s the general population and the
government have expressed grow-
ing concern for the country's
environmental resources.24 Federal
regulation regarding river resource
protection has continued to evolve.25
In 1968, Congress passed
the Wild and Scenic River Act
(WSRA).26  Congress stated that
the policy of the United States was
that certain rivers and their
immediate environments that pos-
sess "outstandingly remarkable sce-
nic, recreational, geologic, fish and
wildlife, historic, cultural, or other
similar values" should be maintained
and preserved in their "free-
flowing" condition.2 7 Further,
Congress established that both the
river segments and their immediate
environments were to be pro-
tected.2 1 Congress also established
that the national policy of building
dams and other river construction
needed to be complimented by a law
and policy that would protect and
preserve rivers in their original
condition.29 Congress enacted the
WSRA to "protect the water quality
of such rivers and to fulfill other vital
14 Id.
15 Id.
*6 Id. at 112. After the District court denied this preliminary injunctive reliefunder the WSRA, the Wildlife Association filed
its second motion for a preliminary injunction claiming that the Forest service violated the MBTA. Id. at 114. See supra note
11. The District court denied this motion, claiming that it did not havejurisdiction over such a claim and that such claims were
subject to judicial review under the National Forest Management Act. Id. See infra notes 44-46.
" Newton County WildlifeAss'n, 113 F.3dat 113.
' Id.
19 Id
20 Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also affirmed the District Court's ruling regarding the MBTA. Id. at 114. The
Court held that the MBTA does not apply to government agencies. Id at 115. The court also held that its views and
conclusions were tentative because-the agency responsible for administering and enforcing the statute, the Fish and
Wildlife Service, has agency discretion not subject to judicial review in determining who must obtain MBTA permits for
timber sales. Id.
21 Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended in sections of 43 U.S.C.). Eric L. Hiser, Piloting the Preservation/
Development Balance on the Wild and Scenic Rivers, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1044, 1046 (1988). See entire article for a detailed
historical analysis of the WSRA. See also Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers A ct of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
707(1970).
12 Hiser, supra note 21, at 1046.
23 Ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§79 1a-825r). See Hiser, supra note 21, at 1046. See also
MARc REisNER, CADILLAC DESERT 115-24, 179-81 (1987) (detailing the federal commitment to irrigation, hydropower
production and dams).
24 Hiser, supra note 21, at 1046.
23 Id.
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national conservation purposes. "0
Under the WSRA, either
Congress31 or a state legislature32
can designate a river as a wild and
scenic river. Congress sought to
ensure full consideration of both the
preservation and development val-.
ues of each designated wild and
scenic river before it was desig-
nated under the statute.33  The
WSRA requires that before at-
tempting to classify a river segment,
an agency seeking protection of a
river segment must prepare a report
for circulation to relevant federal
agencies.31 The report must show
"the characteristics which make the
area a worthy addition to the
system; the current status of land
ownership and use in the area; [and]
the reasonably foreseeable poten-
tial uses of the land and water which
would be enhanced, foreclosed, or
curtailed if the area were in-
cluded. "3" Unless the lands to be
included are entirely federally
owned, the agencies are required to
consult with the respective state.36
By creating these formal require-
ments for WSRA protection, Con-
gress wanted to ensure that each
designation would best serve the
nation by assuring that planning for
preservation and development val-
ues both occur at the beginning
stage. 37
In 1986, Congress amended
the WSRA, requiring the agency
responsible for the designated river
segment to prepare a comprehen-
sive management plan ("WSRA
plan") discussing protection of the
river values. 38 This comprehensive
management plan was required to
"address resource protection, devel-
opment of lands and facilities, user
capacities, and other management
practices necessary and desirable to
achieve the purposes of the
WSRA. "3 The responsible agency
must prepare a WSRA plan within
three fiscal years from the date of
designation. 4 0 Further, the statute
states that the plan must "be
coordinated with and may be
incorporated into resource manage-
ment planning for affected adjacent
Federal lands (emphasis added). "4'
In addition to the WSRA
plan, the Forest Service is required
by statute to maintain land and
resource management plans for
each national forest 4 2 The plans
provide for the use and yield of
forest products and for the coordina-
tion of outdoor recreation, timber,
wildlife and fish, and wilderness.43
Each designated river seg-
ment becomes a component of the
national river system.1 Following
the designation of a particular river
segment, the responsible agency
must define the boundaries of each
river component within one year of
the designation, determining how
much land adjacent to the river is
included in the designation. " The
act specifically requires that the
boundaries shall include an average
of not more than three hundred and
twenty four acres per mile from the
ordinary high water mark on both
sides of the river. '
The WSRA restricts the
jurisdiction and discretion of admin-
istrative agencies in dealing with
designated wild and scenic rivers.
30 Id.
31 6 U.S.C. §1273(a)(i) (1994).
32 16 U.S.C. §1273(a)(ii) (1994). These rivers can only become part of the system if designated by a state legislature and
approved by the Secretary of the Interior (the §2(a)(ii) process). Id. Rivers designated in this manner shall be administered
by the state without expense to the federal government except for the management of federally owned lands. Id
1 Hiser, supra note 21, at 1049.
34 16 U.S.C. §1275(a) (1994).
3 Id.
3 16 U.S.C. § 1275 (b).
" Hiser, supra note 21, at 1050.
38 Pub. L. No. 99-590, 100 Stat. 3330 (1986) (codified in scattered sections, including 16 U.S.C. § 1 274(d)(1) (1994)). The "river
values" referred to are those defined in § 1271.
3 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d)(1) (1994) (Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act).
40 Id. The plans must be published in the Federal Register. Id.
4 Id.
42 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) (1994). See supra note 7.
43 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) (1994).
" 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a) (1994).
4 16 U.S.C. § 1274(b) (1994). Congress allows a different date if it is provided for in subsection (a). Id. Notice of the
boundaries and classification must be published in the Federal Register and are not effective until ninety days after being
forwarded to the President and Speaker of the House. Id.
46 Id.
" See 16 U.S.C. § 1278(a) (1994) (restricting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and any other department or agency
of the United States from licensing the construction of any dam, water conduit, reservoir, powerhouse, transmission line, or
other works under the Federal Power Act after the designation of such a river segment).
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Congress prohibited agencies from
permitting developments which would
adversely affect the values for
which the river segment was
designated.48  The responsible
agency must protect its "aesthetic,
scenic, historic, archeologic, and
scientific features."49 Congress
required that the Secretary of the
Interior or, where national forest
lands are involved, the Secretary of
Agricultur, must be notified if the
construction of a project would
conflict with these purposes.s0
The WSRA states that the
head of the federal agency with
jurisdiction over any lands which
"include, border on, or are adjacent
to" any river included within the
system, shall take action respecting
management policies, regulations,
contracts, and plans affecting such
lands." These actions must be taken
as necessary to protect river
segments in accordance with the
purposes of the WSRA-52
B. Wilderness Society v.
Tyrrel"
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit
decided a case of first impression
regarding timber sales in an area
adjacent to another area protected
by the WSRA.s4 At issue was the
Forest Service's proposed sale of
timber wood damaged by fire from
an area located immediately around
portions of the South Fork of the
Trinity River, an area protected by
the WSRA.5 The South Fork of the
Trinity River became part of the
WSRA through the §2(a)(ii) pro-
cess56 after being approved by the
Secretary of the Interior in early
198 1.7
The District Court found
that the proposed salvage sale
violated the WSRA, and issued an
injunction." The Court found that
the WSRA mandated that the Forest
Service prepare a WSRA plan prior
to conducting land management
activitiesi." The Court also found
that the Forest Service's own
manual dictated the need for a
management plan before timber
sales could be made. 6
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
framed its analysis by identifying
three issues. 6' The first issue was
whether the WSRA required a
comprehensive management plan
before land management activities
could take place on lands located in
or adjacent to areas designated by
the §2(a)(ii) process. 62 The second
issue dealt with whether the Forest
Service's own guidelines mandated
that WSRA plans be completed
before such sales could take place. 63
Third, the Court discussed the Forest
Service's legal duty to protect the
4 Hiser, supra note 21, at 1051 (citing 16 U.S.C. §1278(b)).
16 U.S.C. §1281(a) (1994). This section links agency planning and administration to the designated areas. Id. 16 U.S.C.§ 1281 reads:
Each component of the national wild and scenic rivers system shall be administered in such manner as to protect and
enhance the values which caused it to be included in said system without, insofar as is consistent therewith, limiting other
uses that do not substantially interfere with public use and enjoyment of these values. In such administration primary
emphasis shall be given to protecting its esthetic, scenic; historic, archeologic, and scientific features. Management plans for
any such component may establish varying degrees of intensity for its protection and development, based on the special




The Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the head of any other Federal department or agency
having jurisdiction over any lands which include, border upon, or are adjacent to, any river included within the National Wild
and Scenic Rivers System or under consideration for such inclusion.. .shall take such action respecting management policies,
regulations, contracts, plans, affecting such lands...as may be necessary to protect such rivers in accordance with the
purposes of the chapter. Id.
53 918 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter WildernessSoc 'Il].
* See id. See also Clifford I. Levenson, Wetlands and Scenic Rivers, 21 ENvTL. L. 1245 (1991).
" WildernessSoc'y I, 918 F.2d at 815.
5 See infra note 80 for a detailed explanation of the §2(a)(ii) process.
" WildernessSoc yIl 918 F.2d at 815 (citing 46 Fed.Reg. 7484 (Jan. 23, 1981)). According to the WildernessSoc ': court, there
were numerous complaints that the process was unduly rushed at the end of the Carter administration for political reasons. Id.
(citing Andrews & Buchsbaum, Federalism and the Wild and Scenic RiversAct: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 59 WASH.
L. REV. 417 (1984)).
' See WildernessSoc'yv. Tyrrel, 701 F. Supp. 1473, (E.D. Cal. 1988) [hereinafter Wilderness Soc y].
'9 Wilderness Soc 'yl, 701 F. Supp. at 1487.
60 Id. at 1488.
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designated river segments under the
WSRA and whether these duties
were satisfied."
The Court began by exam-
ining the WSRA's purpose in
placing restrictions on water re-
source projects, federal mining, and
mineral leases affecting lands
within the systemA6 The Court
recognized that the river area's
administration must protect the
values that justified the river's
designation." The Court also
recognized that these restrictions
were placed on federal agencies
engaged in projects around desig-
nated river segments.67
The first issue was whether
the WSRA required a federal
agency to prepare a comprehensive
management plan before land
management activities take place
on lands in or adjacent to WSRA
river segments."8 The District
Court relied on the language in
§1283(a) to hold that the agency
was required to create "manage-
ment policies, regulations, con-
tracts, [and] plans" to protect the
designated river segments. 69 The
Ninth Circuit held that §1283(a)
required agencies to consider the
values as stated in the WSRA when
conducting an independent project
or plan.70 While recognizing this as
a "subtle" distinction, it found that
this differed from a mandatory
procedural requirement, in that
responsible federal agencies pre-
pare a plan under the act itself "
The Wilderness Society
contended that the language - in
§ 1281 mandated the preparation of
WSRA plans by the Forest
Service. 2 Because there was no
express language in the statute
requiring the WSRA plan, the Court
held that it could not infer that a plan
was required before land manage-
ment activities could take place. 3
The Court also held that
language in § 1274(d) did not apply
to river segments designated under
the §2(a)(ii) process prior to the
1986 amendment 74 It found that
this section's requirement that the
managing agencies review existing
plans was not the same as requiring
the creation of plans before the
amendment was passed.7  The
Court did note that under the
statutory scheme preceding the
1986 amendment, the WSRA only
expressly required that a managing
agency develop comprehensive
management plans for rivers desig-
nated by Acts of Congress. 76
However, while the Court was not
willing to impose its own notions of
procedural priority, it noted that "the
preparation of comprehensive man-
agement plans prior to embarking on
land management activities would
be a prudent measure to ensure that
the purposes of the Act are being
respected."77
The second issue ad-
dressed by the Ninth Circuit was the
District Court's ruling that the
Forest Service Manual required that
a management plan must be
6 Id.
65 Id
* Id. at 816.
6' Id (citing 16U.S.C. §1283(a)).
aId. at 815.
*Id. at 817. See supra note 52 for the exact language of §1283.
70 WildernessSoc'yll, 918F.2dat817.
71 Id.
72 Id See supra note 49 for the exact language of §1281.
7 WildernessSoc 'yII, 918 F.2d at 817. The Court noted that its ability to interpret statutes does not provide it the ability to
add statutory requirements. Id.
74 Id. Section 1274(d) states in pertinent part:
(1) For rivers designated on or after January 1, 1986, the Federal agency charged with the administration ofeach com-
ponent of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System shall prepare a comprehensive management plan for such river
segments...
(2) For rivers designated before January 1, 1986, all boundaries, classifications, and plans shall be reviewed for
conformity within the requirements of this subsection within 10 years through regular agency planning processes. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1274(d) (1994).
" WildernessSoc 'y, 918 F.2d at 817-18.
7 1 d. at 818.
7 Id.
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prepared. 7 Like the requirement in
the WSRA, the Court held that the
legislation did not require a time limit
for plans for lands designated prior
to 1986."
Finally, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed §§1281 and 1283, which
laid out management requirements
for federal agencies with jurisdic-
tion over lands covered by the
WSRA8s0  The Forest Service
argued that the WSRA was not
applicable because the timber sales
at issue rested on lands a quarter of
a mile from the river.' The Court
interpreted § 1283(a) to give federal
agencies jurisdiction over activities
either within or adjacent to the river
systen. 8 2 The proposed sale of
timber, it concluded, could impact
the river's protected values and
was subject to the laws of the
WSRA. 3 Ultimately, the Court
determined that the issue of
whether the.proposed sales violated
the. WSRA's purposes - was a
question of fact and remanded the
case for a factual determination as to
whether the Forest Service fulfilled
its obligations under the WSRA.14
IV. THE INSTANT DECI-
SION
In Newton County Wildlife
Association v. US. Forest Ser-
vice," a case of first impression in
the Eighth Circuit, the Court dealt
with two primary issues in deciding
whether the Forest Service's four
timber sales violated the WSRA and
warranted an injunction.86 The first
question involved determining
whether the Forest Service must
complete comprehensive manage-
ment plans as described in 16 U.S.C.
§ 1274(d)(1) before approving tim-
ber sales." The second issue
involved whether the WSRA re-
quired management plans, given that
the timber sales lay outside of the
protected regions as designated by
Congress.88
The timber sales at issue
were approved between August 23,
1994, and September 12, 1995."
The three-year deadline for the
completion of the WSRA plans was
September 30, 1995.90 The Wildlife
Association argued that because the
WSRA plans were not completed
within the three-year deadline, the
Forest Service's four timber sales
must be preliminarily enjoined until
the agency completed the WSRA
plans.91 In support of its argument,
the Wildlife Association relied on
cases involving situations where
plans or studies were a statutory
precondition to the agency actions
under review.'
The Court found that the
WSRA did not mandate completion
of the WSRA plan before timber
sales may be approved 9 It thus
concluded that the Forest Service
did not violate agency law by
approving the timber sales while the
management plans were still in the
7 Id. The Wilderness Society relied on §2354.32 of the Forest Service Manual entitled "River Management Plan." Id. It
reads:
Manage river areas which either Congress or the Secretary of the Interior designates as components of the National
Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems in accordance with the requirements of the Act ... Forest Supervisors shall prepare and
approve an implementation plan for each river area included in the NW & SRS by (a) Act of Congress or (b) Secretary of the
Interior designation under §2(a)(ii) of the Act. When a river crosses more than one National Forest, the Forest Supervisors
involved shalljointly prepare and approve the implementation plan. Complete the plan by the date specified in the legislation
or within three years after designation by the Secretary of the Interior, for rivers designated on or after January 1, 1986. Forest
Service Manual §2354.32 (Region 5 Supp. 165) (July 1988).
* WildernessSocy1l, 918 F.2d at 818.




8 Id at 820.
8 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997).






' Id See Kleppev. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,398402 (1976) (National Environmental Policy Act); LaFlammev. F.E.R.C., 852
F.2d 389,402(9th Cir. 1988) (Federal Power Act); Thomasv. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754,763-64 (9th Cir. 1985) (Endangered Species
Act). The Court concluded that there was not statutory precondition in this case. Newton County Wildlife Ass', 113 F.3d
at 112.
9 Newton County WfildlifeAss'n, 113 F.3d at 112.
160 MELPR
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planning process.94  Further, the
Court found that the Forest Service
was not required to suspend the
timber sales until the plans were
completed.95 The Court held that
absent statutory direction, failure of
an agency to meet a mandatory time
limit does not void agency action."
The Court also asserted
that an agency has substantial
discretion in deciding procedurally
how it will meet its obligations.97 It
reasoned that because the Forest
Service amended its own manage-
ment plan to take into account the
1992 WSRA designations and
because it prepared an environmen-
tal assessment plan before approv-
ing the timber sales, the Forest
Service met its own procedural
requirements before approving the
sales.98 The Court stated that the
Forest Service did not rely on the
WSRA plans as evidence of its
compliance with the statute.' Since
there was nothing in the WSRA
requiring that WSRA plans be
completed before timber sales were
approved, the Court concluded that
the agency's procedural autonomy
would be usurped if it were required
to complete such plans.10
The Forest Service argued
the four timber sales lay outside the
boundaries of the designated river
segments.o'0 The Court noted that
the Wildlife Association failed to
refute that contention.' 02 On appeal,
the Forest Service argued that the
WSRA plans need only encompass
lands lying within a designated
segment, and its failure to complete
the plans could not affect the timber
sales. 0 3 The Court applied the plain
meaning rule in finding that the
planning requirement only related to
the designated river segments.1 14
Moreover, the Court found failureto
complete the plans on time could not
be a basis for enjoining timber sales
on lands lying outside any desig-
nated area.0  According to the
Court, §1281(a), which links plan-
ning and administration by the
agency to the designated compo-
nent, confirmed this application of
the plain meaning rule. 106 Because
of this interpretation, the Court
found that WSRA plans were
limited to lands lying within the
designated river segments, and that
failure to prepare plans in a timely
manner was not a basis for enjoining
timber sales on outside areas. 0
Nonetheless, in Footnote 4
the Court recognized that the
WSRA' 8 imposes a responsibility
on agencies for lands "which
include, border upon, or are adjacent
to" designated river segments."
The Court concluded, however, that
§1283(a) did not require agencies
that own lands adjacent to these
river segments to prepare WSRA
plans, but only to take actions that
protect these river segments. 0
V. COMMENT
Since its adoption in 1968,
courts and agencies have struggled
with the interpretation of the
WSRA.i" The WSRA's language
has caused these reviewing tribu-
nals difficulty in conforming with
Congress' goals.112 Newton County
and Wilderness Society exemplify
this difficulty. Both cases are
9 Id.
9 Id.
* Id. (citing Brotherhood ofRy. Carmen v. Pena, 64 F.3d 702,704 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (Federal Railroad Administration deadline
requiring a petition for reconsideration in four months); Kinion v. United States, 8 F.3d 639,644 (8th Cir. 1993) (Farmer's Home
Administration 60-day time limit to provide buyout information to debtors)).
* Newton County ildhifeAss'n, 113 F.3d at 113 (citing Sierra Clubv. Cargill, 11 F.3d 1545, 1548 (10th Cir. 1993)).
* Id.
* Id.
'0 Id. In Footnote 2, the Court said that a party who is damaged by an agency's failure to meet a statutory planning deadline
may seek a court order requiring the agency to complete the plan. Id. (citing Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 260 n.7
(1986)). The Court noted that the Wildlife Association did not separately challenge the Forest Service's failure to prepare
WSRA plans. Id.








1" Newton County WildhifeAss'n, 113 F.3d at 113.
110 Id
"' Hiser, supra note 21, at 1045.
112 Id.
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matters of first impression in their
respective jurisdictions, dealing
with the statutory requirement of
comprehensive management plans
as required in §1274(d)(1) of the
WSRA. While the Ninth Circuit
made a sound decision based on the
language of § 1274(d)(1), the Eighth
Circuit, while reaching a desirable
result, confused an already
complicated WSRA. Further, the
Eighth Circuit's interpretation re-
laxed statutory requirements that
Congress expressly stated, opening
the door to environmental abuse in
areas located in and around those
protected by the WSRA.
A. The Eighth Circuit
The first issue raised in the
Eighth Circuit's decision was
whether WSRA plans were. re-
quired before the timber sales could
be made." The timber sales were
approved prior to the agency's
deadline."' The Forest Service
was not required to suspend the
implementation of the timber sales
when it failed to complete the plans
on time."'5 If the timber sales were
made subsequent to the deadline,
however, it seems that the Court
should have reached a different
result in order to protect the river's
values. The Court was quick to
conclude, however, that based on
the language in §1274(d)(1),
completion ofWSRA plans was not
a prerequisite for the approval of
timber sales." 6 The, Court thus
suggested that the Forest Service
could have approved timber sales
after September 30, 1995, when the
WSRA plans were due, even if the
WSRA plans were not completed.
The statute provides that
the management plans address
''resource protection . . . and other
management practices necessary to
achieve the purposes of[WSRA].""
The Court seemed to imply that
because the statute does not
specifically state that the plans are
required before timber sales can be
approved, that plans are not
required. Obviously, Congress
could not take into account every
situation in which a rivers segment's
resources might be affected. How-
ever, the designation by Congress
and the policy and purpose in the
statute, imply that it is in situations in
which resources are affected, like
the sale of timber, that plans are
needed.
Further, the Court in New-
ton County noted that the Forest
Service prepared its own environ-
mental assessment before approv-
ing the timber sales and did not rely
on WSRA plans as evidencing its
compliance with the WSRA." 8 The
Court held that ". . .absent statutory
directive, we would usurp the
agency's procedural autonomy if
we compelled it to channel its
compliance efforts into a particular
planning format."" 9 It seems that
§1274(d)(1) provides this statutory
directive, requiring that plans be
made within three fiscal years.120
From this very language, however,
the Eighth Circuit would not require
a WSRA plan (only some agency
plan), even if the timber sales
occurred after the three-year
deadline had passed because the
statute did not specifically require a
WSRA plan.
While Congress did not
expressly require that on-going land
management activities be halted
when the three-year deadline is
violated, it seems clear that land
management activities should not
be started after this three-year
deadline is violated. Section 1274
implies that WSRA plans are a
prerequisite to land management
activities even if other agency plans
are required. Only once these
WSRA plans are completed may
they then be incorporated into the
agency's own management plans.
This would protect both the purpose
and the policy of the WSRA.121
The second issue the
Eighth Circuit addressed was
whether WSRA plans were re-
quired when timber sales occur on
an area adjacent to protected
lands. 12 2 The language in § 1274
requires that WSRA plans are to be
coordinated with "resource man-
agement planning for affected
adjacent Federal lands." 2 3 It is
clear in this case that the lands
where the timber sales occurred
were Federally owned.12 4  The
Court relied on what it called the




" 16U.S.C. §1274(d)(1) (1994).
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"' See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
122 Newton County Wildlife Ass'n, 113 F.3d at 112.
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plain meaning of § 1274.125 It seems
quite clear that nowhere in this
section does Congress limit the
planning requirement to the bound-
aries of the river segment. Instead
of only using the "plain meaning" of
§1274 to determine Congress's
intent, the Court should have looked
to other statutes, specifically §§ 1271,
1281(a), and 1283(a).
Section 1271 protects both
river segments and their "immediate
environments." 26 Requiring that
adjacent lands be included in WSRA
plans before an agency approves
action affecting such areas would
only further this policy.
The Eighth Circuit rea-
soned that §1281(a) confirmed its
"plain meaning" interpretation of
§1274 in that it "links agency
planning and administration to the
designated components." 27  The
Court seemed to imply that this
section limits planning and adminis-
tration to the designated component.
However, nowhere in §1281(a)
does Congress limit an agency's
planning and administration to lands
within designated areas. Instead,
§1281 states that an agency shall
administer lands to protect the
values for which the lands were
included in the WSRA.2 8 Timber
sales on lands adjacent to WSRA
segments would definitely affect
these values. Requiring a plan
would only further the WSRA
policy.
In a footnote, the Eighth
Circuit recognized that §1283(a)
imposes a general obligation on
agencies for lands that are adjacent
to those areas designated by
Congress.2 9 The Court concluded,
however, that this does not require
agencies managing adjacent land to
prepare a WSRA plan, only to take
actions in protecting the designated
rivers and their surrounding areas. 30
Although it is true that § 1283 does
not expressly require WSRA plans
for lands adjacent to those protected
under the WSRA, it does state that
agencies shall take action respecting
management policies and plans as
necessary to protect the purposes of
the WSRA."'3 In order to respect
these policies and plans, it would
seem more logical that the courts use
this statute to require plans. The
Court's argument that it could not
create procedural requirements is
countered by the fact that §1274
contains this procedural require-
ment. Section 1283 should have
been interpreted to tie this proce-
dural requirement to bordering and
adjacent lands. This interpretation
would allow for a more consistent
statute that protects the purposes of
the WSRA.
Although the Eighth Circuit
correctly ruled that WSRA plans are
not required for agencies invoking
timber sales prior to the statutory
deadline, its dicta indicates that plans
are not required before agencies
may approve any timber sales and
that adjacent Federally owned lands
do not require WSRA plans.'13 2
Federal agencies may interpret this
ruling to mean that no WSRA plans
are required before timber sales
may be approved, regardless of
whether the property is on or
adjacent to the protected lands. This
would seem a logical rationalization
based on the Court's ruling, yet one
that appears to be against Congres-
sional intent.
B. The Ninth Circuit
In Wilderness Society, the
Ninth Circuit used a sound analysis
in determining that plans are not
required. It held that because the
language in the statute expressly
states that WSRA plans are required
only for rivers designated on or after
1986 (the river was designated prior
to that), WSRA plans are not
required.' Further, the pre-
amendment act only required
WSRA plans for rivers designated
by Acts of Congress, not those
designated under the 2(a)(ii) pro-
cess. 134
It is interesting to question
how the Ninth Circuit would have
ruled on the facts in Newton
County. Because the planning
deadline was after the timber sales
took place, it is very likely the Ninth
Circuit would have reached the
same result. A likely future factual
scenario is one essentially the same
as Newton, but where the planning
deadline has expired.
The Ninth Circuit held that
because there is no express
language in § 1283(a) requiring a
WSRA plan, one is not needed
m.3 Id. See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
126 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1994). See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
16U.S.C.§1271 (1994).
'2 16 U.S.C. §1281(a)(1994). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
129 Newton County WildlifeAss'n, 113 F.3d at 113 (citing 16 U.S.C. §1283(a) (1994)).
130 Id.
"' 16U.S.C. §1283(a)(1994).
32 Newton County WildlifeAss'n, 113 F.3d at 113.
'3 WildernessSoc 'yll, 918 F.2d at 819.
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1274(b) (1982)).
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before management activities can
take place." Because §1281(a)
does not contain the express
requirement for WSRA plans, the
Ninth Circuit saw no need for
WSRA plans prior to conducting
land management activities on
federal lands adjacent to or within
designated segments.
The Wilderness Society
court used logic similar to its §1281
analysis in determining that §1283
does not require WSRA plans. It
held that while the statute requires
agencies to take action respecting
WSRA policies and plans, the
WSRA does not mandate the
formulation of a plan as a
procedural requirement." 6
The Ninth Circuit held that
§§1281(a) and 1283(a) do not
require the preparation of WSRA
plans -before land' management
activities can take place. The Court
also stated, however, that "the
preparation of comprehensive man-
agement plans prior to embarking
on land management activities
would be a prudent measure to
ensure that the purposes of the Act
are respected."' 37  The Ninth
Circuit was unable to impose
notions of procedural priority in
Wilderness Society.'3 ' Based on
this conflicting reasoning, it is
unclear how the Ninth Circuit would
decide a case in which the timber
sales occurred after the WSRA
plan deadline had expired. How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit seemed to
use §§1281(a) and 1283(a) to
interpret the requirements of
§ 1274. It seems highly possible that
the Ninth Circuit could have
interpreted these sections differ-
ently had a WSRA plan been
required under § 1274.
It is interesting to note that
while the Eighth Circuit used this
§1281 and §1283 analysis to
determine that WSRA plans are not
required for lands adjacent to
designated river segments, the
Ninth Circuit used these sections to
determine that management plans
are generally not required. This
exemplifies the poor statutory
language used in the Act and the
difficulty suffered by courts in
interpreting it. It would seem more
logical that the courts use these
sections of the Act to tie agency
planning and administration to-
gether, while using the express
language in § 1274 to determine if a
WSRA plan is actually required.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the vague
statutory language used in § 1281(a)
and § 1283(a), courts will continue to
struggle with the interpretation of
§ 1274, requiring the development of
comprehensive management plans.
The opinion in Newton County
could have clarified the WSRA by
examining the holding in Wilderness
Society and the broad intentions of
Congress. Instead the Eighth
Circuit continued to muddy the
waters in its interpretation of the
WSRA and abolished the plain and
logical intentions of Congress. The
result will be continued struggles
with whether a comprehensive
management plan is required for
lands that affect those protected by
the WSRA. Ultimately, it could
open the door for abuse by agencies
that control these lands.
1 Id.
136 Id.
138 Id. at 818.
138 Id.
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